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Abstract
The statutory minimum wage in Japan is revised every year and increases by
almost the same amount across prefectures, regardless of the disparity in the
wage distribution across prefectures. Due to this feature of minimum wage
setting, the minimum wage cuts into the wage distribution deeply in rural
Japan. We examine the impact of the minimum wage on employment, focus-
ing on middle-aged women, who are known to be typical, low-wage workers
in Japan. The results, based on a panel estimation, suggest that minimum
wage has a large impact on employment; the workers whose current wage is
below the revised minimum wage are about 20 percentage points less likely
to be employed in the following year than the low-wage workers who are not
aected by the revision of the minimum wage.
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1 Introduction
This paper estimates the eect of minimum wage on employment among
middle-aged women in Japan. The minimum wage in Japan has been set
at a very low level compared with its average wage for a long time. For
example, the ratio of minimum wage to median wage1 in 1997 was 0.31 in
Japan, whereas it was 0.57 in France, 0.49 in the Netherlands, 0.46 in New
Zealand, 0.40 in Canada, 0.38 in the US, and 0.32 in Spain (Table 2.3 in
OECD [1998]). This considerably low level of eective minimum wage has
discouraged researchers' interest, and there has been virtually no research
directly examining the eect of the minimum wage on employment in Japan.
However, we should doubt the eect of minimum wage on the employment of
middle-aged female workers, particularly in rural areas, due to the following
reasons. First, the male-female wage gap in Japan is larger than it is in other
developed countries. Second, while the wage distributions are heterogeneous
across Japan's prefectures, the regional minimum wage is not very hetero-
geneous, for egalitarian purposes. Third, current ongoing deation and its
associated nominal wage decline presumably make the minimum wage more
likely to bind. These economic conditions and the institution of minimum
wage setting in Japan may cause a more serious bite of minimum wage for
subgroups of workers in certain regions. Neumark and Wascher [2004], for
example, emphasized the importance of examining the institution of mini-
1including overtime pay and bonuses
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mum wage setting for each country, in addition to looking at the national
measure. This research attempts to enact their suggestion.
The disemployment eect of minimum wage has been widely examined in
North American and European countries. Early studies attempted to iden-
tify the disemployment eect using time series data. However, since the late
1980s, US researchers have used cross-state variations of the minimum wage
to identify its disemployment eect. The usage of time series data became
unpopular because it is dicult to disentangle the eect of minimum wage
from the eect of macro shocks that can be correlated with revisions in the
level of the minimum wage. More credit has been given to the results based
on state-level panel data that principally have applied a dierence in dier-
ence (DID) approach to identify the disemployment eect of the minimum
wage. In these studies, the state that changed the minimum wage was clas-
sied as the treatment group and the other states, whose minimum wages
were unchanged, were classied as the control group. A famous example
of research that applied DID to identify the disemployment eect was Card
and Krueger [1994], while another famous example that used all 50 states
was Neumark and Wascher [1992]. As indicated by Card and Krueger [2000]
and Neumark and Wascher [2000], there has been heated controversy regard-
ing the existence of the disemployment eect of minimum wage in the US,
and we believe it is still fair to say that a denitive conclusion has not been
reached.
While US researchers have exploited the existence of state variations in
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the minimum wage to identify its eect on employment, European researchers
have struggled to dene appropriate treatment and control groups because
European countries tend to have uniform, nationwide minimum wage sys-
tems. A recent study by Machin et al. [2003] examined the eect of the newly
introduced statutory national minimum wage on employment in a low-wage
industry, the residential care homes industry. They used the initial aver-
age wage of the homes' workers to dene the control and treatment groups.
The workers in homes whose average wage was originally below the newly
adopted minimum wage were classied as the treatment group, and those
in homes whose initial average wage was above the minimum were classied
as the control group. These researchers found a moderate disemployment
eect. Pereira [2003] used the increase of the minimum wage that applied
only to workers aged 18 and 19 in 1985 in Portugal to dene the control and
treatment groups. She found a signicant decrease in the employment of
these workers, as well as a signicant increase in the employment of workers
aged 20 to 25 through the substitution eect, using workers aged 30 to 35
as a control group. See Machin and Manning [1997] and Brown [1999] for a
review of the literature regarding Europe.
To consider the identication strategy for Japan, we now briey explain
the institution of minimum wage setting in Japan (See Araki [2002] and
Sugeno [2002] for further explanations). The Japanese minimum wage is a
statutory minimum wage based on the MinimumWages Law enacted in 1959,
which was substantially revised in 1967. The current law denes two types of
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minimum wage, 1. regional minimum wages based on collective agreement;
and 2. minimum wages based on the study and deliberations of the minimum
wage councils. Although the rst system assumes that the minimum wage
agreed upon by craft-wide or industry-wide bargaining will be extended to
non-unionized workers in the same sector, such bargaining does not really ex-
ist under the Japanese enterprise union system. Thus, practically speaking,
all minimum wages in Japan are currently determined by type 2. Under this
system, the chief of the prefectural labor bureau determines the level of the
prefectural minimum wage based on the regional minimum wage councils'
deliberations. These deliberations are largely inuenced by the \criteria"
for the amount of minimum wage increase set by the central minimum wage
council annually. The central minimum wage council consists of representa-
tives of public interest (academicians and a retired bureaucrat), employers,
and employees. The central council divides all Japanese prefectures into four
ranks, based on the actual level of wage within them and the dierentials in
the cost of living. The central minimum wage council then issues the \cri-
teria" for the amount of minimum wage increase for each rank. Prefectures
classied as Rank A set the highest minimum wage; the daily minimum wage
was 5514 yen and the hourly minimum wage was 698 yen in 1999 in Tokyo,
an increase in 49 yen from the previous year. At the same time, prefectures
in Rank D set the lowest minimum wage. For example, the daily minimum
wage was 4756 yen and the hourly minimum wage was 595 yen in Miyazaki
in the same year and the dierence from the previous year was 42 yen for the
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daily minimum. Between 1993 to 1999, which is the sample period for our
analysis, the classication of prefectures into ranks changed once, in 1995.
In this re-classication, 3 prefectures moved from Rank C to B, 2 prefectures
moved from Rank D to C, and two prefectures moved from Rank B to C
(Abe [2001]). Except for this re-classication, each prefecture had been clas-
sied into the same rank for every year. Due to the fact that the amount of
increase was about one percent of the original minimum wage and the rate of
the minimum wage increase was almost homogeneous across prefectures, it
is virtually impossible to identify the disemployment eect of the minimum
wage based on the variation in the change of minimum wage across prefec-
tures. This fact prohibits us from using DID as an identication strategy
in Japan. Prefectural minimum wages are revised every year based on the
above procedure and the revised minimum wages take eect beginning on
September 30 or October 1 of the same year.2
The legal enforcement of the minimum wage is weak in Japan. The prefec-
tural labor bureau is in charge of enforcement and when it detects employers'
non-compliance with the minimum wage, they could be responsible for nes
up to 20 thousand yen (about 160 US dollars), which is negligible. Employers
who violate the minimum wage law have to compensate employees for the
dierence between the minimum wage and the actual wage. The minimum
wage is mostly enforced through public pressure on employers. In particu-
2There are some exceptional cases in which the revised minimum wage takes eect in
the middle of October, but this is very rare.
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lar, larger-sized employers would lose their reputations if the public were to
notice that they pay less than the minimum wage to their workers.
Facing the diculty of how to identify the disemployment eect of the
minimum wage due to the system of minimum wage setting in Japan, we
adopted the methodology proposed by Currie and Fallick [1996] and Yuen
[2003]. We compared the change in employment status among those workers
whose current wage is below the newly set minimum wage level and those
workers whose current wage is above new minimum wage, using panel data
of workers. The former group of workers was treated by the minimum wage
and other workers were not treated and thus served as a control group. If we
nd that the former group of workers was less likely to be employed in the
following year than those workers in the latter group, we arguably can conrm
the disemployment eect of minimum wage. The estimation results point to
a large disemployment eect: The average employment rate of the workers
treated by the minimum wage was about 20 percent lower than that of the
workers who were not treated by the minimum wage. The results are robust
against the change in the denition of the control group. The results did
not change in the xed eects estimation, which allowed for time-constant,
individual heterogeneity.
To the best of our knowledge, there are three studies that have examined
the relationship between minimum wage and wage distribution in Japan.
Using a comprehensive current status survey of part-time workers (Pat Taimu
Rodosha Sogo Jittai Chosa), Abe [2001] examined the wage distribution of
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part-time, female workers in 1990 and 1995 in comparison with the minimum
wage set for each prefecture. She concluded that, on average, the level of the
minimum wage is set at a low level, so that the minimum wage generally
does not bind. However, she found that the prefectural minimum wage tends
to bind in rural areas because the average wages in rural area are generally
low, while the level of the minimum wage is not so heterogeneous across
prefectures. She speculated that the disemployment eect of the minimum
wage would be minimal because the minimum wage does not bite the wage
distribution. Based on the same data, Kohara [2000] found that the minimum
wage cuts into the distribution of wage in rural areas, and Nagase [1997]
pointed out that about 50 percent of part-time workers earned less than
100 yen plus the minimum in 1990. The above studies pointed out that
the minimum wage in Japan is set at a low level compared with its average
wage, but it does cut into the wage distribution in rural areas. None of
the above studies, however, have examined the impact of minimum wage on
employment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
empirical strategy to identify the disemployment eect of minimum wage.
Section 3 explains the data. Section 4 reports and discusses results. Section
5 checks the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Empirical Models
We rst attempt to examine whether the minimum wage changes the wage
distribution. We identify the eect of minimum wage on wage increase among
low-wage workers by estimating the following model:
wit = 0 + 1bindit 1 + xit 1 + uit; given empit 1 = 1; (1)
where i is the index for individuals, t is the index for year, bindit 1 is the
dummy variable indicating the minimum wage treatment (i.e. mwit 1 
wit 1  mwit), and xit 1 is the vector of explanatory variables that captures
the strength of individual workers' labor market attachment. If the minimum
wage aects the wage of low paid workers, 1 > 0 is expected.
Second, to identify the disemployment eect of minimum wage using
panel data, we estimate the following linear probability model:
empit = 0 + 1bindit 1 + xit 1 + uit; given empit 1 = 1; (2)
with all the notations the same as before. Although the dependent variable
is binary, we adopt the linear probability model because allowing for each
worker's xed eects is easy in the framework of such models. The parame-
ters in this model are consistently estimated via OLS under the assumption
that the error term is not correlated with the independent variables. This
assumption is violated if those workers belonging to the treatment group (i.e.
bindit 1 = 1) have unobserved characteristics that make them more likely to
drop o from the labor market than the workers belonging to the control
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group (i.e. bindit 1 = 0). To relax this rather strong assumption, we allow
for each worker's heterogeneity by assuming
uit = ci + vit: (3)
If the independent variables are strictly exogeneous from the composite error
term uit, the random eects estimator is the ecient estimator under the
assumption that vit is i.i.d. The xed eects estimator is a consistent esti-
mator, even when individual time-xed heterogeneity, ci, is correlated with
the independent variables. Thus, the xed eects estimator allows for the
possibility that those low-wage workers treated by the minimum wage have
a weak, labor market attachment.
The issue of the workers' heterogeneity in the treatment and control
groups is also addressed by restricting the control group. To avoid the pos-
sibility of comparing very dierent types of workers to estimate the eect of
minimum wage, we restricted our analysis sample to low-wage workers (i.e.,
those workers whose current wage is less than 110 percent of the current
minimum wage). By comparing the estimated results from full and restricted
samples, we can roughly learn how the heterogeneity of workers aected our
estimates. It is also worth mentioning the timing of the minimum wage re-
vision and the time of survey. The revised minimum wage takes eect on
either September 30 or October 1, depending on the prefecture, while the
survey takes place sometime in October. Thus, when (1) is estimated as is,
we implicitly assume that the revision of the minimum wage that takes place
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at the beginning of October aects the wage that is reported in October.
3 Data
This study uses the Japan Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) collected by
the Institute of Household Economics (Kakei Keizai Kenkyusho). This sur-
vey is based on a national, representative sample of women who were between
the ages of 24 and 34 in 1993, which was the starting year of the survey.3
The survey included 1,500 women at the beginning and added 500 women
in 1997. The survey has been implemented between October 1 and Octo-
ber 31 of every year. We pooled all the data between 1993 to 1999 and we
obtained special permission to use the data set with each respondent's prefec-
ture code. This prefecture code enabled us to match a prefectural minimum
wage to each respondent. The information on prefectural minimum wage
was obtained from The Pandect of Minimum Wage Determination (Saitei
Tingin Kettei Yoran), which is published every year. We disregarded the
industrial minimum wage because the industry code recorded in the JPSC
is too rough to match with the industrial minimum wage, which is dened
with very detailed industry classications.
The construction of our analysis sample is illustrated in Table 1. We
restricted our analysis sample to those workers who received their wage on
an hourly or daily basis. Our estimation also required observations for two
consecutive years; 1438 observations remained after this sample restriction.
3Information on their family members was also collected.
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This basic analysis sample is called the full sample hereafter. We further
restricted our sample to the workers whose current wage was below 110 per-
cent of the ongoing minimum wage to include only low-wage workers in the
sample. This restriction reduced the sample size to 236 and we call this
sample restricted sample A hereafter. To exclude those workers who were
temporarily classied as low-wage workers, we further restricted our sample
to workers whose wage was less than 110 percent of the current wage for two
years or more during the sample period. This additional restriction reduced
the sample size to 148, and we call this sample restricted sample A' hereafter.
This restricted sample A' is used to estimate the random and xed eects
models. Restricted sample A includes those workers whose wage were be-
low the current minimum wage. We further restricted our sample to exclude
these workers and call the sample restricted sample B. This sample includes
148 observations. The observations that belonged to restricted sample B for
two years or more are called restricted sample B' and its sample size is 96.
The restricted samples B and B' are used in the robustness check.
The descriptive statistics for the analysis sample appear in Table 2. Col-
umn (1) reports the means of the dependent and independent variables of
the observations for the control group in the full sample. Columns (2) and
(3) report the means of variables for the control group in restricted samples
A and B respectively. Comparing the columns for the control group with
column (4), which is the column for the treatment group, we notice that
the individual characteristics are similar between the control and treatment
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groups in terms of marital status, the number of children, and age. Workers
in the treatment group have slightly more years of job tenure, but slightly
fewer years of job experience. Workers in the control group of the full sample
naturally had more extensive higher educational backgrounds than workers
in the treatment group; however, workers in the control group in the re-
stricted samples A and B had slightly less educational background than the
workers in the treatment group. There are some individuals who were in
the sample in year t   1 but not in year t because they did not respond to
the interview or had missing information. This sample attrition may have
caused attrition bias in our estimation. We calibrated the seriousness of the
attrition bias by examining the characteristics of attritors in year t  1. The
sample means for these attritors are tabulated in Column (5). Comparing
the sample means for Columns (1) and (5), we arguably can conclude that
these attritors were not signicantly dierent from the non-attritors in terms
of observed characteristics in year t  1.
Figures 1 to 4 draw the time series of the ratio of minimum wage to av-
erage wage in each prefecture. We used the Basic Survey on Wage Structure
by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare to obtain the national average
of hourly rate of pay among female part-time workers (Table 4 of Rodo-
Horei-Kyokai [Each Year]). Figure 1 is for prefectures identied as Rank A
in the minimum wage classication, which are urban prefectures.4 For two
prefectures among those in Rank A, we can observe that the minimum wage
4The rank classication of each prefecture is based on the classication in 1993.
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ratio increased over time. Figures 2, 3, and 4 are for prefectures classied
as Ranks B, C, and D respectively. We can observe that the minimum wage
ratio to average wage increased over time. The ratio varied by a large amount
among prefectures in Ranks C and D. For many prefectures in Ranks C and
D, the ratio exceeded 0.75. This nding suggests that the minimum wage is
set relatively high in those prefectures classied as Ranks C and D, which
are rural prefectures. Thus, we can speculate that disemployment due to the
minimum wage would be serious in rural areas if there is any disemployment
eect.
4 Results
4.1 The impact of minimum wage on wage distribution
The estimation results for the eects of minimum wage on the change of
wage appears in Table 3. The regression results based on the full sample,
which are reported in column (1), indicate that those workers treated by the
increase in minimum wage experienced about a 4 percentage points higher
wage growth rate than the workers in the control group. The coecient is
not precisely estimated, perhaps because only 18 observations are treated in
year t   1. In addition, some of the treated workers were dropped due to
the disemployment eect of the minimum wage hike. Among the 18 cases
that were treated by the minimum wage, only 10 are included in the sample
of 963 workers. Regardless of this statistical insignicance, the size of the
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coecient is not negligible if it is taken seriously.5
Columns (2) and (3) report the estimation results based on the restricted
samples A and B respectively. We again found the positive eect of the
minimum wage treatment on wage growth, but the estimated eects are not
statistically signicant. The estimated eects are 0.017 and 0.023 respectively
and these eects are large, considering the fact that the minimum wage
is raised by 1 percent annually. The statistical insignicance is not that
surprising, considering the fact that only 10 workers were treated by the
minimum wage among 151 and 106 observations respectively.
These results indicate that the minimum wage in Japan does not neces-
sarily form the wage oor among low-wage workers. This is either because
of weak law enforcement of the minimum wage or the fact that a very small
number of workers is aected by the minimum wage in the sample because
those workers whose wage was potentially treated by the minimum wage were
dropped from the sample due to their possible disemployment. Thus, the fact
that the minimum wage treatment does not have a statistically signicant
eect on the wage distribution is not so discouraging.
4.2 The impact of minimum wage on employment
Now we move onto the disemployment eect of minimum wage. Table 4
reports the estimated impact of the minimum wage on employment in the
5We also tried the specication that includes wi;t 1 as an explanatory variable to be
consistent with human capital theory as in Neumark and Taubman [1995], but the results
did not change in an essential way.
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following year. The results in Column (1) indicate that those whose wage is
below the revised minimum wage are 10 percentage points less likely to be
employed in the following year. The estimated results are not statistically
signicant, however. To apply the panel estimation methods, we restricted
the sample to those individuals that were observed for two years or more
and this sample restriction reduced the sample size to 1213. The results
of the OLS estimation appear in Column (2). The size of the coecient
shrinks, probably due to the fact that the treatment group and the control
group became more homogeneous in terms of their degree of labor market
attachment due to the further sample restriction. The results of the random
and xed eects estimations appear in Columns (3) and (4) respectively.
All the results indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
minimum wage does not aect employment in the following year due to the
large standard error around the estimated coecients.
The estimation results reported above may be criticized because the con-
trol group includes those workers who received wages far above the minimum
wage. If workers with a high wage have a stronger attachment to employ-
ment, the above estimations overestimate the adverse eect of minimum wage
on employment. To address this possible criticism, we restrict our sample
to those individuals whose current wage is below 110 percent of the current
minimum wage to include only low-wage workers in the control group. Notice
that those workers whose current wage is below the current minimum wage
also are included in this control group. The results of the estimation based
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on this restricted sample A appears in Table 5. For the OLS and random ef-
fects estimation, we obtain the coecient around -0.15 with a standard error
of 0.08 or 0.09. For the xed eects estimation, we obtain the coecient of
-0.23 with a standard error of 0.13. We marginally reject the null hypothesis
of no eect of the minimum wage on employment. This estimated coecient
implies that those workers who are treated by the minimum wage are about
15 or 23 percentage points less likely to be employed in the following year.
The dierence in the results from Table 4 implies that those workers with a
higher current wage have less attachment to employment. When those work-
ers with the minimum wage treatment are compared with low-wage workers
without the minimum wage treatment, we found the larger disemployment
eect of minimum wage because of low-wage workers' stronger attachment
to employment. We prefer the estimates in Table 5 to the estimates in Table
4 because low-wage workers are a more natural control group for the workers
treated by the minimum wage. This result contrasts with the results ob-
tained from the US and Canada; in those countries, low-wage workers are
more likely to drop o from employment. We speculate that this is because
we used female workers as a sample. High-wage female workers presumably
have better marriage oers and may be more likely to drop out of the labor
market, even after considering the fact that they receive a high wage.
The above estimation strategy may invite another criticism because the
sample includes those workers who work for employers not complying with
the minimum wage. Those who work for non-complying employers earn an
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even lower wage than those workers who are presumably treated by the mini-
mum wage. Thus, those workers intrinsically may have a stronger attachment
to employment than workers treated by the minimum wage. If this is the
case, we may have overestimated the adverse eect of minimum wage on
employment. To address this possibility, we further restrict our sample to
those workers whose current wage is above the current minimum wage, but
less than 110 percent of the current minimum wage. The results of the es-
timations based on this restricted sample B appear in Table 6. The results
reported in Column (1) suggest that the results based on restricted sample
A suered from downward bias due to the fact that workers who receive less
than the minimum wage have a stronger attachment to employment. How-
ever, once the sample is conned to workers who were included in restricted
sample B for more than two years (i.e., the sample that can be used for ran-
dom and xed eects estimations), the estimated coecient becomes about
-0.2 with standard error of 0.11, as reported in Column (2). The increase
in the size of the coecient in absolute value compared with Column (1)
implies that the eect of minimum wage on employment was stronger among
low-wage workers for more than 2 years in the sample. It is natural to expect
that the eect of the minimum wage treatment would be more severe among
\permanent" low wage workers because the sample used to estimate Column
(1) may have included those temporary low wage workers for whom the eect
of minimum wage treatment would be weak. This change of the results is
similar to the change found in Yuen [2003].
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Thus far, we have neglected the issue of panel attrition. If being aected
by the minimum wage itself causes panel attrition, then our estimates may
have been subject to attrition bias. However, we expect this bias to be min-
imal. Among 1505 observations in year t   1, 67 observations dropped out
of the sample in year t, as reported in Table 2. To test for the system-
atic attrition due to the minimum wage treatment, we regressed the dummy
variable indicating the panel attrition on the treatment dummy of minimum
wage (bindi;t 1), along with other explanatory variables included in Tables 3
through 6. The coecient for this treatment dummy is 0.0175 with a stan-
dard error of 0.0568. This result indicates that there is no systematic panel
attrition due to the minimum wage treatment. As for the restricted samples
A and B, only one individual dropped out between years t  1 and t. Thus,
we conclude that the issue of panel attrition is negligible.
5 Conclusion
We examined the impact of the minimum wage on employment in Japan,
using data collected between 1993 and 1999. To estimate the eect, we com-
pared the transition rate from employment to non-employment in a one-year
window between two groups of workers. One of these groups consisted of
workers whose wage was originally above the revised level of the minimum
wage and therefore were not aected by the revision of the minimum wage.
The other group consisted of workers whose wage was below the revised mini-
mum wage and potentially was treated by the revision of the minimum wage.
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The estimation results based on the sample of low-wage workers indicate that
workers in the latter group were about 20 percentage points less likely to be
employed in the following year than those in the former group.
We should admit that we could not draw a denitive conclusion regarding
the impact of the minimum wage on employment because of the small sample
size. However, our results suggest the existence of a large disemployment
eect in Japan, whose magnitude is comparable to that found in the US
and Canada. Further study on this issue with larger government statistics is
urgently needed, considering Japan's current, continuous deation.
References
Yukiko Abe. The eect of regional minimum wage on the wage of part-time
workers (chikibetu saitei tingin ga pat tingin ni ataeru eikyo). In Takenori
Inoki and Fumio Ohtake, editors, An Economic Anlysis of Employment
Policies in Japan (Koyo seisaku no keizai bunseki). University of Tokyo
Press, 2001. in Japanese.
Takashi Araki. Labor and Employment Law in Japan. The Japan Insitute of
Labor, 2002.
Charles Brown. Minimum wages, employment, and the distribution of in-
come. In Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors, Handbook of Labor
Economics Vol. 3. Elsevier, 1999.
David Card and Alan Krueger. Minimum wages and employment: A case
19
study of the fast food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. American
Economic Review, 84(4):772{793, 1994.
David Card and Alan Krueger. Minimum wages and employment: A case
study of the fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply.
American Economics Review, 90(5):1397{1420, 2000.
Janet Currie and Bruce C. Fallick. The minimum wage and the employment
of youth: Evidence from the NLSY. Journal of Human Resources, 31(2):
404{428, 1996.
Miki Kohara. Who are supported by the minimum wage? (saitei chingin
ha dare wo sasaeteiruka?). mimeo, Graduate Research Institute of Policy
Studies, 2000.
Stephen Machin and Alan Manning. Minimum wages and economic outcomes
in Europe. European Economic Review, 41(3-5):733{742, 1997.
Stephen Machin, Alan Manning, and Lupin Rahman. Where the minimum
wage bites hard: The introduction of the uk national minimum wage to a
low wage sector. Journal of European Economic Association, 1(1):154{180,
2003.
Nobuko Nagase. Why do part time workers earn low wage? Insititutional
obstacles (pat chingin ha naze hikuika? shoseido no ashikase). in Progress
of globalization and the labor market - the eect of instituions and policies
- by Institute for Statistical Research, 1997.
20
David Neumark and Paul Taubman. Why do wage proles slope upward?
tests of the general human capital model. Journal of Labor Economics, 13
(4):736{761, 1995.
David Neumark and William Wascher. Evidence on employment eects of
minimum and subminimum wage: Panel data on state minimum laws.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46(1):55{81, 1992.
David Neumark and William Wascher. Minimum wages and employment:
A case study of the fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania:
Comment. American Economic Review, 90(5):1362{1396, 2000.
David Neumark and William Wascher. Minimum wages, labor market insti-
tutions, and youth employment: A cross-national analysis. Indutrial and
Labor Relations Review, 57(2):223{248, 2004.
OECD. Employment Outlook, chapter Chapter 2: Making the most of the
minimum: statutory minimum wages, employment and poverty, pages 31{
79. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1998.
Sonia Pereira. The impact of minimum wages on youth employment in Por-
tugal. European Economic Review, 47(2):229{244, 2003.
Rodo-Horei-Kyokai. Wage Census, volume 3. Rodo-Horei-Kyokai, Each Year.
Kazuo Sugeno. Japanese Employment and Labor Law. Carolina Academic
Press, 2002.
21
Terence Yuen. The eect of minimum wages on youth employment in canada.
Journal of Human Resources, 38(3):647{672, 2003.
22
 23
 
Table 1: Sample Selections 
Selections Description Number of Observations 
Raw data  10504 
Females who live in Japan  10493 
Workers who are paid on an hourly or 
daily basis  1924 
Exclude missing values on wage, job 
tenure, and years of experience  1837 
Observed at both t-1 and t Control group and treatment group 1438 
wi,t-1 ≦ 1.10 * mwi,t-1 Sample A 236 
In sample A for more than two years  Sample A' 152 
mwi,t-1 ≦ wi,t-1 ≦ 1.10 * mwi,t-1 Sample B 148 
In sample B for more than two years  Sample B' 96 
mwi,t-1 ≦ wi,t-1 ≦  mwi,t Treatment group 18 
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Table 2: Sample Means 
Notes: The sample includes the 1171 female workers who were paid on an hourly basis and the 267 female workers who were paid on a daily basis. The dummy variable, employmentit, equals one if the 
respondent was employed during year t and zero if she was not employed during year t. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 In Sample in Year t  Out of Sample in Year  t 
Control group Treatment group  
Variables 
Full Sample Sample A               (wi,t-1 ≦ 1.10 mwi,t-1) 
Sample B      
(mwi,t-1≦wi,t-1≦1.10 mwi,t-1) 
  
Employmentit 0.837 0.876 0.869 0.722  
Characteristics in Year  t-1      
Hourly wage 900.57 624.55 646.05 618.75 878.27 
Daily wage 6507.9 4097.81 5060.1 4879.7 7260.0 
Married 0.717 0.812 0.823 0.722 0.642 
Number of children 1.231 1.541 1.492 1.278 0.986 
Age 31.46 31.66 31.66 31.83 30.00 
Job tenure 2.152 2.318 1.966 3.986 2.290 
Years of experience 9.155 8.857 8.608 7.653 7.719 
Educational background:      
College or graduate school (16+ years) 0.074 0.023 0.015 0.056 0.075 
Junior or technical college (14 years) 0.200 0.165 0.192 0.278 0.119 
Career college (14 years) 0.180 0.133 0.131 0.056 0.239 
High school (12 years) 0.522 0.651 0.623 0.556 0.522 
Junior high school (9 years) 0.020 0.028 0.038 0.000 0.045 
Other 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 
City size:      
13 large cities 0.234 0.147 0.123 0.111 0.284 
Other cities 0.549 0.555 0.669 0.722 0.433 
Towns or villages 0.217 0.298 0.208 0.167 0.284 
Number of Observations 1420 218 130 18 67 
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Table 3: The Effects of the Minimum Wage on the Change of Wage 
Ordinary Least Squares; Dependent Variable: log wageit - log wagei,t-τ 
Notes: Clustering robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes female hourly 
and daily workers who were employed during year t. Other explanatory variables in the 
estimation models are an intercept, age, the number of children, and the dummy variables of 
year, prefecture, marital status, and education. 
 
Table 4: The Effects of the Minimum Wage on Employment 
Dependent Variable: employmentit 
Notes: Clustering robust standard errors and Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses and 
square brackets, respectively. The sample includes female hourly and daily workers who were 
employed during year t. Other explanatory variables in the estimation models are an intercept, 
age, the number of children, and the dummy variables of year, prefecture, marital status, and 
education. 
 
Table 5: The Effects of the Minimum Wage on Employment, Restricted Sample A 
Dependent Variable: employmentit 
Notes: The same note applies as in Table 4 
 
Table 6: The Effects of the Minimum Wage on Employment, Restricted Sample B 
Dependent Variable: employmentit 
Notes: The same note applies as in Table 4 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Explanatory Variables Control group Restricted sample A Restricted sample B
0.0413 0.0168 0.0231 bindi,t-1 (0.0425) (0.0612) (0.0580) 
Number of Observations 963 151 106 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory Variables OLS OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
-0.1097 -0.0414 -0.0613 -0.1153 bindi,t-1 (0.0887) (0.0828) [0.0844] [0.1013] 
Number of Observations 1438 1213 1213 1213 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory Variables OLS OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
-0.1504 -0.1449 -0.1654 -0.2257 bindi,t-1 (0.0925) (0.0858) [0.0825] [0.1272] 
Number of Observations 236 152 152 152 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory Variables OLS OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
-0.0782 -0.2173 -0.2362 -0.4023 bindi,t-1 (0.1025) (0.1111) (0.0932) (0.1436) 
Number of Observations 148 96 96 96 
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    Figure 3 
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